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courts, benefit of the bargain damages.1 The law, however, is not
wholly consistent as to when such damages are available.2 Some
courts, for example, have held that defrauded buyers may only recover out-of-pocket damages,3 under California Civil Code (“CCC”) §
3343,4 a rule the Fifth District currently follows.5 The Second District, in 2004, held the contrary,6 concluding that where financial inju1

See Fragale v. Faulkner, 1 Cal. Rptr. 3d 616, 622-24 (Ct. App. 2d Dist. 2003) (fraud in
purchase of home); Salahutdin v. Valley of California, Inc., 29 Cal. Rptr. 2d 463, 468-69
(Ct. App. 4th Dist. 1994) (prosecution of case on a negligence theory, upon finding of constructive fraud by fiduciary); Pepitone v. Russo, 134 Cal. Rptr. 709, 711 (Ct. App. 1st Dist.
1976) (damages for loss of motel as a result of fiduciary fraud would be motel’s fair market
value plus refinancing expenditures plaintiff incurred trying to forestall foreclosure, noting
relevant statutes “tend to” provide a benefit of the bargain recovery).
2
See Strebel v. Brenlar Invs. Inc., 37 Cal. Rptr. 3d 699, 704-05 (Ct. App. 1st Dist. 2006)
(discussing split of authority on proper measure of damages under CCC § 3333 for a real
estate broker's intentional fraud); Fragale, 1 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 622-24 (discussing split, but
authorizing repair costs as damages approximating benefit-of-the-bargain damages); Salahutdin, 29 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 468-69 (discussing split and awarding benefit-of-the-bargain
damages on constructive fraud theory where case prosecuted under negligence theory); Walters v. Marler, 147 Cal. Rptr. 655, 670 (Ct. App. 1st Dist. 1978) (CCC § 3333 tends to give
the injured party the benefit-of-the-bargain (or the difference between the actual value of
what he received and what he expected to receive), and, insofar as possible, to place him in
the same position as he would have been had the promisor performed) (citing, e.g., Pepitone,
134 Cal. Rptr. at 711, but noting Overgaard v. Johnson, 137 Cal. Rptr. 412, 413 (Ct. App.
5th Dist. 1977), held § 3333 does not set forth a benefit-of-the-bargain rule but rather a tort
measure of damages (the purpose of which is to compensate for loss sustained) rather than
providing benefit of any contract bargain); Zeppenfeld v. Reilley, No. A110461, 2007 WL
4480140, at *10 (Cal. Ct. App. 1st Dist. Dec. 28, 2007) (awarding difference in value between what was actually received and what plaintiff was fraudulently led to believe he would
receive, noting authority split on damages).
3
See, e.g., Hensley v. McSweeney, 109 Cal. Rptr. 2d 489, 492 (Ct. App. 5th Dist. 2001)
(discussing split and refusing to award benefit-of-the-bargain damages); Overgaard, 137
Cal. Rptr. at 413. See also Strebel, Cal. Rptr. 3d at 704-05 (citing Hensley and Overgaard);
Zeppenfeld, 2007 WL 4480140, at *10.
4
CAL. CIV. CODE § 3343 (West. 2014). The text of CCC § 3343 is set forth in its entirety
in the text below at page ____ .
5
See, e.g., Hensley, 109 Cal. Rptr. at 492; Roque-Duran v. Bird, F063155, 2012 WL
6641370, at *3-4 (Cal. Ct. App. 5th Dist. Dec. 21, 2012) (denying benefit-of-the-bargain
damages under Hensley).
6
See Fragale, 1 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 622-24 (rejecting contrary authority); Salahutdin, 29 Cal.
Rptr. 2d at 469-71; Diaz v. Ajrab, No. B203081, 2009 WL 784056, at *5-6 (Cal. Ct. App. 2d
Dist. Mar. 26, 2009); Taheri v. Khadavi, Nos. B222132, B226670, B228313, 2012 WL
119976, at *14-17 (Cal. Ct. App. 2d Dist. Jan. 17, 2012) (given fiduciary breach, plaintiff
could recover lost profits and value of shares at time of trial); Molina v. Jeffery,
B225753, 2012 WL 2354650, at *6 (Cal. Ct. App. 2d Dist. June 21, 2012) (rejecting argument that court erred in applying benefit of the bargain approach to the breach of fiduciary
duty claim where plaintiff claimed entitlement to “[a]t a minimum, [to] the out-of-pocket
loss” of her $50,000 capital contribution and up to $108,221, representing value of misappropriation of funds and prejudgment interest, noting courts have discretion to determine
proper measure of damages under CCC § 3333, citing Strebel, 37 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 706-07).
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ry arising from a real estate sale transaction traces to fiduciary fraud
or fiduciary recklessness, benefit of the bargain awards are permissible,7 under CCC §§ 33338 and 1709,9 rejecting the Fifth District
view.10
Other courts have held that although CCC §§ 3333 and 1709
permit a recovery to make the injured plaintiff whole, neither statute
expressly states plaintiff may receive the benefit of his bargain as
damages,11 although the statute, in the words of some cases, “tends”
to award benefit of the bargain damages or its equivalent.12 The
method by which benefit-of-the-bargain damages may be computed
is also unclear. Although California’s jury instructions set forth a
computation which subtracts the value of what plaintiff received from

7

See Fragale, 1 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 622-24; Salahutdin, 29 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 469-71; Mastantuono v. Creekside Fin., Inc., No. B244966, 2014 WL 1493171, at *5 (Cal. Ct. App. 2d
Dist. Apr. 17, 2014) (measure of damages for fiduciary breach is all loss proximately caused
by the breach, including loss of the benefit-of-the-bargain, citing Fragale, noting that if
damages were measured by the difference between the property as represented and the actual
value, measure would not be adequate to compensate plaintiffs for their losses—trial court
properly held losses to be the principal amount of the loan plus interest, plus costs for completing home and foreclosing); Trattmann v. Key, B241337, 2013 WL 5519356, at *3-4
(Cal. Ct. App. 2d Dist. Oct. 7, 2013) (in action to quiet title, measure of damages for fraud
committed by a fiduciary is the “benefit-of-the-bargain” measure under CCC §§ 1709 and
3333). See also Green v. Johnson, No. B239546, 2013 WL 1768971, at *5 (Cal. Ct. App. 2d
Dist. Apr. 25, 2013).
8
CCC § 3333 provides: “For the breach of an obligation not arising from contract, the
measure of damages, except where otherwise expressly provided by this code, is the amount
which will compensate for all the detriment proximately caused thereby, whether it could
have been anticipated or not.”
9
CCC § 1709 provides: “One who willfully deceives another with intent to induce him to
alter his position to his injury or risk, is liable for any damage which he thereby suffers.”
10
Salahutdin, 29 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 468-71.
11
See, e.g., Zarate v. Century 21 Su Casa, No. H029470, 2007 WL 1555808, at *2 (Cal.
Ct. App. 6th Dist. May 30, 2007) (CCC § 3343 provides that the out-of-pocket measure of
damages applies in the case of fraud in the purchase, sale or exchange of property, but where
the victim is defrauded by a fiduciary, damages are authorized by CCC §§ 1709 and 3333,
but noting that Overgaard clarified that CCC § 3333 does not set forth any benefit-of-thebargain rule, but set out a tort measure of damages to compensate plaintiff for a loss sustained, not the benefit of any contract, holding it is unclear whether benefit of the bargain is
available for intentional misconduct under CCC § 3333).
12
See Pepitone, 134 Cal. Rptr. at 709 (where property was lost to foreclosure due to a real
estate brokerage firm’s failure to disclose an acceleration clause in second deed of trust,
CCC §§ 3333 and 1709 were applicable—court observed these provisions “tend to” give the
injured party the benefit of his bargain and, insofar as possible, to place him in the position
he would have been in had the promisor performed the contract—the faithless fiduciary must
make good the full amount of the loss he causes and courts must consider the loss sustained,
not the value with which the injured party parted).
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what he was promised, plus interest and consequential damages,13
some cases suggest a fiduciary-defrauded plaintiff may obtain, for
example, full market appreciation, through the date of trial, a form of
benefit-of-the-bargain recovery, to realize plaintiff’s expectancy interest, which does not follow from the form instruction.14
Expectancy-protective remedies frequently result in greater
damages than out-of-pocket damage measures, serving deterrent purposes.15 Cases which have departed from California’s benefit-of-thebargain jury instruction, have awarded damages in excess of what the
text of the instruction seems to provide.16 Courts, however, generally
refuse to place plaintiffs in a better position than they would have
been in if the fraud had not occurred.17 The choice of damage theory
is particularly important where, for example, a fiduciary buyer’s broker is involved,18 or where a single real estate firm acts as a broker
for both buyer and seller, a so-called dual broker or agent situation.19
13

See, e.g., Hackbart v. Uppal, D059657, 2013 WL 4041955, at *8-9 (Cal. Ct. App. 4th
Dist. Aug. 8, 2013) (one defrauded in the purchase or sale of property is entitled to recover
the difference between the actual value of that with which the defrauded party parted and the
actual value of that received—“value” ordinarily means “market value” as determined by the
price at which property could be resold in an open market or private sale if its quality or other characteristics which affect its value were known).
14
See, e.g., Strebel, 37 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 704-05 (awarding market appreciation damages
(citing Estate of Anderson, 196 Cal. Rptr. 782 (Ct. App. 1st Dist. 1983))).
15
See Stout v. Turney, 586 P.2d 1228, 1231-32 (Cal. 1978) (“out-of-pocket rule” has been
viewed as more consistent with the logic and purpose of the tort form of action, i.e., compensation for loss sustained rather than satisfaction of contractual expectations—“benefit-of-thebargain” rule a more effective deterrent).
16
See Fragale, 1 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 622-24; Salahutdin, 29 Cal. Rptr. 2d 463, 468-69.
17
See, e.g., SourcingLink.Net, Inc. v. Carrefour, S.A., No. D049638, 2008 WL 933556
(Cal. Ct. App. 4th Dist. Apr. 8, 2008) (judgment notwithstanding the verdict properly granted where jury award would have placed plaintiff, which claimed it entered into a licensing
agreement based on fraudulent misrepresentations, in a better position than if the misrepresentations had not been made where the agreement was terminable on 90-days notice and
contained no fixed term but award presupposed contract would last 10 years—because plaintiff failed to present evidence of out-of-pocket damages for 90-day period, the trial court
properly limited plaintiff to compensation for detriment suffered by restoring plaintiff to the
financial position enjoyed before the transaction, based on value of rights given up).
18
Under California law, a buyer’s broker is deemed a fiduciary of the buyer and has duties beyond that of visual inspection as is statutorily mandated for a seller’s broker under
CCC § 2079. See Field v. Century 21 Klowden-Forness Realty, 73 Cal. Rptr. 2d 784, 78990 (Ct. App. 4th Dist. 1998) (imposing duties independent of reasonable visual inspection
under CCC § 2079 on fiduciary buyer’s broker—broker’s failure to properly determine size
of easement fell below standard of a reasonable broker because broker failed to obtain reasonably obtainable material information—brokers may not simply pass information from the
seller to the buyer but must independently verify same or disclose to the buyer that independent confirmation of information is not available or has not been obtained).
19
“Dual agent” is defined in § 2079.13, subdivision (d) as “an agent acting, either directly
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In the latter situation, the broker is inherently conflicted and some
courts deem the broker to not only be a fiduciary of its customer,20
but a trustee, i.e., the highest form of fiduciary.21
California cases have upheld a broad range of expectancybased remedies in cases involving the sale of California real estate
that do not follow the jury instruction computation, decisions attempting to put fiduciary-injured plaintiffs in economic positions they
would have been in, but for the fraud at issue.22
or through an associate licensee, as agent for both the seller and the buyer in a real property
transaction.” California permits a seller's broker to represent the buyer and act in the capacity of a dual agent to complete a property purchase and sale, a principle codified in §§
2079.14 and 2079.16. Section 2079.16 requires disclosure be made to a client for which a
broker is acting as a dual agent and which has a fiduciary duty of utmost care, integrity, honesty and loyalty in the dealings with either the buyer or the seller and a duty of honest and
fair dealing and good faith toward the buyer and the seller—diligent exercise of reasonable
care and skill in performing the duties of an agent. Dual agents must disclose all facts
known to the agent materially affecting the value or desirability of the property and not
known to, or within the diligent attention and observation of, the parties. See A.C. Invs., Inc.
v. Gordon, No. B186421, 2007 WL 520326, at *5 (Cal. Ct. App. 2d Dist. Feb. 20, 2007);
Samuels v. Merrill, No. B190158, 2007 WL 2084093 (Cal. Ct. App. 2d Dist. July 23, 2007)
(in dual broker situation, broker is a fiduciary for buyer and seller (citing Fragale, 1 Cal.
Rptr. 3d at 620-21)).
20
See Brown v. Wells Fargo Bank, NA, 85 Cal. Rptr. 3d 817, 834-35 (Ct. App. 2d Dist.
2008) (fiduciary and confidential relationships exist among parties to a transaction wherein
one party is duty bound to act with the utmost good faith for the benefit of the other; essence
of a fiduciary/confidential relationship is that parties do not deal on equal terms because person in whom trust and confidence is reposed and who accepts that trust and confidence is in
a superior position to exert unique influence over dependent party—duties generally arise
when one party's vulnerability is so substantial as to give rise to equitable concerns).
21
See Ford v. Cournale, 111 Cal. Rptr. 334, 340 (Ct. App. 1st Dist. 1973) (real estate broker has same obligation of undivided service and loyalty that it imposes on a trustee in favor
of his beneficiary (citing Batson v. Strehlow, 441 P.2d 101 (Cal. 2007)); Alhino v. Starr, 169
Cal. Rptr. 136, 143 (Ct. App. 1st Dist. 1981) (imposing on the broker the duty of acting in
the highest good faith, precluding agent from obtaining advantage over principal in any
transaction had by virtue of his agency—the relationship binds the agent to the utmost good
faith not only in form but also in substance and requires full disclosure of all material facts
respecting the property or relating to the transaction in question; failure to make a full and
complete disclosure or any concealment of a material fact is the equivalent of an affirmative
misrepresentation or fraud).
22
See, e.g., Strebel, 37 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 704-05 (awarding market appreciation damages);
Fragale, 1 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 622-24 (cost of repair approximating benefit of bargain damages
where plaintiff failed to provide proof of market value); Anderson, 196 Cal. Rptr. at 782
(awarding market appreciation damages through date of trial); Salahutdin, 29 Cal. Rptr. 2d at
468-69 (benefit-of-the-bargain damages based on comparison of value of property plaintiffs
received and value of the property they would have received had broker’s representations
been true, relying on expert testimony regarding comparable properties, determining damages as of trial date); Pepitone, 134 Cal. Rptr. at 710-11 (noting CCC § 3333 tends to provide
for substantially the same damages as CCC § 3300 for breach of contract, i.e., benefit-of-thebargain, computing damages by subtracting the value of undisclosed encumbering loans on
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Part II discusses California’s law on real estate damages, including CCC § 3343, which sets forth an out-of-pocket rule, CCC §§
3333 and 1709, which, according to some cases, provides for benefitof-the-bargain damages or their equivalent, in cases of fiduciary fraud
or recklessness, or constructive fraud.23 Parts III, IV, V, and VI discuss some of California’s leading real estate damages cases in the
1970s, 1980s, 1990s and 2000s, focusing on the above statutes and
damages theory. Part VII discusses California’s fraud and deceit jury
instruction, including its provision of benefit-of-the-bargain damages,
and concludes California law protects real property purchaser expectancies, in fiduciary fraud and recklessness contexts, as well as cases
of constructive fraud, making benefit-of-the-bargain damages (or
their equivalent) available to injured plaintiffs.
II.

REAL ESTATE DAMAGES: RELEVANT STATUTES AND JURY
INSTRUCTIONS
A.

Introduction

California law provides two measures of damages for fraud,
the out-of-pocket measure and benefit-of-the bargain measure.24 The
the subject motel, from the fair value of the motel, and adding refinance charges the injured
party incurred in an effort to avoid a foreclosure—award intended to put plaintiff in the position he would have been in, but for defendant’s failure to disclose the encumbering loans).
See generally Wayne v. Byrens, B227575, 2012 WL 1925410, at *8-11 (Cal. Ct. App. 2d
Dist. May 29, 2012) (where neither out-of-pocket nor benefit-of-the-bargain measure was
particularly helpful to jury in fashioning award, jury could reasonably conclude an award of
some interest in company was necessary to compensate appellant for detriment suffered due
to defendant’s false promises or it could fashion an award based on a percentage of amount
derived from sale of property (then rolled into different property) in reliance on defendant’s
false promises—jury's award was within a reasonable range to compensate plaintiff for all
detriment, no new trial).
23
See, e.g., Salahutdin, 29 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 468-69 (citing cases and commentators);
Fragale, 1 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 622-24. See generally Woodruff v. Bekeris, B233470, 2012 WL
653896, at *4 (Cal. Ct. App. 2d Dist. Feb. 28, 2012) (benefit-of-the-bargain measure is concerned with satisfying the expectancy interest of the defrauded plaintiff by putting him in the
position he would have enjoyed if the false representation relied upon had been true; it
awards the difference in value between what the plaintiff actually received and what he was
fraudulently led to believe he would receive).
24
See Fragale, 1 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 621-25 (noting split, authorizing benefit-of-the-bargain
damages); Salahutdin, 29 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 468-71 (awarding benefit-of-the-bargain damages
where defendant fiduciary’s misconduct, although not actually fraudulent, amounted to a
“constructive fraud” within the meaning of California law). See also Graves v. Esyon Corp.,
No. G035700, 2006 WL 2869566, at *4 n.8 (Cal. Ct. App. 4th Dist. Oct. 10, 2006) (discuss-
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out-of-pocket measure restores a plaintiff to the financial position he
enjoyed prior to the fraudulent transaction by awarding the difference
in actual value between what the plaintiff gave and what he received,
as of the date of the fraud.25 The benefit-of-the-bargain measure
places a defrauded plaintiff in the position he would have enjoyed
had the false representation been true, awarding him the difference in
value between what he actually received and what he was fraudulently led to believe he would receive.26
In the context of real estate transactions not involving the
fraudulent acts of fiduciaries, California has limited defrauded parties
to out-of-pocket damages.27 An exception has been recognized for
cases where the injury is the result of fiduciary fraud or recklessness
or, according to some courts, constructive fraud.28
B.

The Relevant Statutes
1.

CCC § 3343

CCC § 3343 provides: Fraud in purchase, sale or exchange of
property; additional damages.
(a) One defrauded in the purchase, sale or exchange of
property is entitled to recover the difference between
the actual value of that with which the defrauded person parted and the actual value of that which he received, together with any additional damage arising
ing split in authority on availability of benefit-of-the-bargain damages, noting that in Alliance v. Rothwell, 900 P.2d 601 (Cal. 1995), California’s Supreme Court held a plaintiff may
recover only out-of-pocket damages for a fiduciary's negligent misrepresentation, but left
open whether a plaintiff may recover benefit-of-the-bargain damages for a fiduciary's intentional fraud).
25
See Zeppenfeld, 2007 WL 4480140, at *10 (out-of-pocket measure restores a plaintiff to
position enjoyed prior to the fraudulent transaction, awarding difference in actual value between what plaintiff gave and received).
26
Id. (benefit-of-the-bargain measure places a defrauded plaintiff in the position he would
have enjoyed had the false representation been true, awarding him the difference in value
between what he actually received and what he was fraudulently led to believe he would receive (citing Alliance, 900 P.2d. at 615-16, and Fragale, 1 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 621-25 (noting
split, authorizing benefit-of-the-bargain damages))).
27
See Fragale, 1 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 623-24.
28
Id. at 236-37 (CCC § 3343 does not apply when a victim is defrauded by its fiduciaries;
broader measures of CCC §§ 1709 and 3333 apply, permitting compensation for “all detriment proximately caused”).
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from the particular transaction, including any of the
following: (1) Amounts actually and reasonably expended in reliance upon the fraud. (2) An amount
which would compensate the defrauded party for loss
of use and enjoyment of the property to the extent that
any such loss was proximately caused by the fraud.
(3) Where the defrauded party has been induced by the
reason of the fraud to sell or otherwise part with the
property in question, an amount which will compensate him for profits or other gains which might reasonably have been earned by use of the property had he
retained it. (4) Where the defrauded party has been
induced by reason of the fraud to purchase or otherwise acquire the property in question, an amount
which will compensate him for any loss of profits or
other gains which were reasonably anticipated and
would have been earned by him from the use or sale of
the property had it possessed the characteristics fraudulently attributed to it by the party committing the
fraud, provided that lost profits from the use or sale of
the property shall be recoverable only if and only to
the extent that all of the following apply: (i) The defrauded party acquired the property for the purpose of
using or reselling it for a profit. (ii) The defrauded
party reasonably relied on the fraud in entering into
the transaction and in anticipating profits from the
subsequent use or sale of the property. (iii) Any loss
of profits for which damages are sought under this
paragraph have been proximately caused by the fraud
and the defrauded party’s reliance on it. (b) Nothing
in this section shall do either of the following: (1)
permi the defrauded person to recover any amount
measured by the difference between the value of property as represented and the actual value thereof. (2)
Deny to any person having a cause of action for fraud
or deceit any legal of equitable remedies to which
such person may be entitled.29

29

CIV. § 3343.
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In Zeppenfeld v. Reilley,30 Judge Rivera explained that in
fraud cases involving the purchase, sale or exchange of property, the
“out-of-pocket” rather than the “benefit-of-the-bargain” measure of
damages should apply, as CCC § 3343 provides the exclusive measure of damages for fraud in such cases and excludes benefit-of-thebargain damages by prohibiting the defrauded person from recovering any amount measured by the difference between the value of
property as represented and the actual value thereof.31 Out-of-pocket
damages are directed to restoring the plaintiff to the financial position
he enjoyed prior to the fraudulent transaction, and thus awards the
difference in actual value at the time of the transaction between what
plaintiff gave and what he received, with . . . actual value meaning
“market value.”32 Proof of the property’s actual value at the time of
the fraudulent transaction and time of discovery of the fraud and/or
the time of trial is particularly important and plaintiffs which fail to
produce expert testimony of value are frequently frustrated.33 It is also critical that plaintiff establish the expenditures made are directly
traceable to the fraudulent wrongdoing.34 Where plaintiff fails to establish this, courts have rejected application of the out-of-pocket theory.35
2.

CCC § 3333

CCC § 3333 is California’s general tort damage statute which
provides, in relevant part: “For the breach of an obligation not arising
from contract, the measure of damages, except where otherwise expressly provided by this Code, is the amount which will compensate
30

No. A110461, 2007 WL 4480140, at *10 (Cal. Ct. App. 1st Dist. Dec. 21, 2007).
Id.
32
Id. at *11 (“While cost of repairs has some probative worth on the issue of value, it is
not of itself the proper measure of damages . . . cost of repairs may not be separately assessed without reference to the loss of market value of the property” (citing Sacramento &
San Joaquin Drainage Dist. v. Goehring, 91 Cal. Rptr. 375, 379-81 (Ct. App. 3d Dist. 1970)).
33
See, e.g., Zarate, 2007 WL 1555808, at *4 (plaintiff’s failure to produce expert testimony to prove property was worth less than he paid, precluded finding of damages).
34
Id. (when defrauded person has made reasonable expenditures, these may ordinarily be
recovered where they have been lost or rendered fruitless by the deceit and consequential
damages would be proper if buyer was obliged to move from the property that he had been
fraudulently induced to purchase on account of the dangerous character of the premises—in
such a case, he could not only recover the difference between the amount paid for the property and its actual value, but the expense of moving).
35
Id. (expenses not incurred in reliance on the misrepresentation or fraud should not be
included in a damages award).
31
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for all the detriment proximately caused thereby, whether it could
have been anticipated or not.”36 Civil Code § 3333 damages, according to some cases, are designed to protect the expectancy interest of
persons injured by fiduciary frauds by placing them in the financial
position they would have been in if the fraudulent representations that
induced a transaction were true.37
The phrase “all detriment” has been broadly construed as subsuming such injuries as the inability to obtain desired financing at
specific rates,38 and even emotional distress damages.39 Market adjusted awards, discussed in Part III below, make plaintiffs whole by
forcing defendants to live up to their representations, deterring fiduciary fraud by forcing the defrauding fiduciary to make good total
damages their misrepresentations cause.40
3.

CCC § 1709

CCC § 1709 provides that “[o]ne who willfully deceives another with intent to induce him to alter his position to his injury or
risk, is liable for any damage which he thereby suffers.”41
4.

The Central Question

CCC § 3333 provides that the injured party will receive compensation for “all the detriment proximately caused.”42 Civil Code §
1709 provides the injured party will be compensated for “any damage” he suffers as a result the deception.43 The question is whether
the impairment of the victim’s future financial position as a result of
a fiduciary’s fraud or other wrongful conduct constitute a “detri36

CAL. CIV. CODE § 3333 (West 2014).
See Fragale, 1 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 624.
38
See, e.g., Bankers Realty, Inc. v. Shiotsugu, No. B190143, 2008 WL 73691, at *3-4
(Cal. Ct. App. 2d Dist. Jan. 8, 2008).
39
See, e.g., id. at *4; Jahn v. Brickey 214 Cal. Rptr. 119, 123-25 (Ct. App. 4th Dist.
1985); Quezada v. Hart, 136 Cal. Rptr. 815, 819 (Ct. App. 2d Dist. 1977).
40
See Fragale, 1 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 622 (benefit-of-the-bargain damages calculated to require the faithless fiduciary to make good the "full amount of the loss” (quoting Salahutdin,
29 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 470-471). Appreciation damages may be awarded under CCC § 3333,
noting flexibility as to date used to compute damages which should reflect goal of compensation for entire loss. Id. at 470 (citing Anderson, 196 Cal. Rptr. at 782 (1983)).
41
CAL. CIV. CODE § 1709 (West 2014).
42
CIV. § 3333.
43
CIV. § 1709.
37
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ment,” under §3333, or “any damage,” within the meaning of CCC
§1709. Restated, do these statutes, CCC §§ 3333 and 1709, individually or collectively, provide for “benefit-of-the-bargain damages” or
its equivalent in cases of fiduciary fraud notwithstanding that the
phrase “benefit-of-the-bargain damages” does not appear in the statutory text?
III.

THE 1970S—FORD, PEPITONE, OVERGAARD, AND WALTERS
A.

1974 - Ford v. Cournale

In Ford v. Cournale,44 plaintiff, a 70 year old widow, sued a
broker and salesman for fraud and misrepresentation arising from
plaintiff’s purchase of an apartment building.45 Although defendants
provided financial information about the building and information
about its condition to plaintiff, they did not further investigate the
owner’s books and records but relied solely on the owner’s statements about the building.46 In fact, a number of apartments were
leaking, there were maintenance problems and difficulties with tenants not yet evicted.47 Expert testimony showed the building had
been greatly overvalued.48 The court found that plaintiff’s fiduciaries
had no basis other than the statements of the broker as to projected
net income for the building, a fact material to plaintiff.49 Although
the broker had access to the books and records of the building’s prior
owners, they were not reviewed.50
Ford established that brokers, in selling properties, may not
simply accept the seller’s statements regarding the condition of the
premises and/or the financial bona fides of an income producing
property without independently reviewing public information to confirm them.51 The court held that the trial court’s restrictive view of
damages was error and that monies over and above out-of-pocket
damages could be available where rescission was not a viable species
44
45
46
47
48
49
50
51

111 Cal. Rptr. 334 (Ct. App. 1st Dist. 1974).
Id. at 336.
Id. at 337.
Id.
Id. at 337-38.
Ford, 111 Cal. Rptr. at 338.
Id. at 340.
Id. at 342.
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of relief, an issue to be addressed on remand.52
B.

1976 - Pepitone v. Russo

Pepitone v. Russo53 involved a retrial solely on the issue of
damages. Plaintiff had sued for fraud and breach of fiduciary duty
seeking damages when she lost her motel through a foreclosure resulting from her real estate brokerage firm’s failure to disclose a second deed of trust encumbering the property had an acceleration
clause.54 The jury found for plaintiff in the amount of $85,735.55 Respondents moved for a new trial and, on retrial, the court, reduced
damages to $25,834.56 Plaintiff, appealed, arguing she should have
been awarded the benefit of her bargain under CCC § 3333, rather
than being subject to an out-of-pocket recovery.57 The appeal court
began by explaining that CCC § 3333 and 1709 were applicable and
tend to give the injured party the benefit of her bargain:
California law is committed to the view that the fraudulent breach of fiduciary duty is a tort, and the faithless fiduciary is obligated to make good the full
amount of the loss of which his breach of faith is a
cause. . . . Where, as here, the defrauding party stands
in a fiduciary relationship to the victim of fraud, the
damages must be measured pursuant to the broad provisions of sections 3333 and 1709 regulating compensation for torts in general. . . . [T]he measure of damages provided by the foregoing sections is
substantially the same as that for breach of contract
prescribed by section 3300; i.e., it tends to give the injured party the benefit of his bargain and insofar as
possible to place him in the same position he would
have been had the promisor performed . . . .58

52

Id.
134 Cal. Rptr. 709 (Ct. App. 1st Dist. 1976).
54
Id. at 710-11.
55
Id. at 710.
56
Id.
57
Id.
58
Pepitone, 134 Cal. Rptr. at 711 (citations and some text omitted). See also Burkhouse
v. Phillips, 96 Cal. Rptr. 197 (Ct. App. 1st Dist. 1971) (in action against broker and sellers
for rescission of residential home sale, instruction that plaintiffs could not recover if there
53
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The court held that, insofar as possible, its job was to place the injured party in the same position she would have been in had the
promisor performed the contract.59 Therefore, the court concluded it
was required to consider the loss sustained rather than the value with
which the injured party parted.60 The court stated:
Under the benefit of the bargain doctrine we must
consider the loss sustained by appellant rather than the
value with which she parted . . . we must look solely
to the fair market value of the motel which was lost by
reason of respondents’ breach and the expenditures
that appellant incurred in her efforts to forestall the
foreclosure.61
Plaintiff was made whole through damages equivalent to what she
lost.62 She obtained the value of what the motel would have been
worth if the misrepresentations had not been made and refinance
costs, as well, that would not have been incurred but for the foreclosure.63 The court upheld the trial court’s discretionary determination
that plaintiff should not obtain pre-judgment interest, which would
have placed her in a better position than if no fraud occurred.64
Pepitone establishes that where parties stand in a fiduciary relation under CCC §§ 3333 and 1709, damages may consist of the
monetary equivalent of what was lost, and, that because costs that
would not have been incurred, but for the wrongdoing, are recoverable, there is no need for pre-judgment interest.65 The court deemed
the value of the hotel, i.e. the benefit of the bargain, to fall within the
phrase “what was lost,” under CCC §§ 3333 and 1709.

was no difference between the purchase price of the property at the time it was sold and the
actual value of the property was error under CCC § 3343—subsequent circumstances may
sometimes be considered, e.g., where foreclosure resulted from defendant’s fraud).
59
Id.
60
Id.
61
Id. (loss sustained by appellant equivalent to difference between the purchase price and
the encumbrances plus refinance charges to prevent foreclosure) (emphasis added).
62
Id.
63
Pepitone, 134 Cal. Rptr. at 711.
64
Id. at 712.
65
Id.
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1977 - Overgaard v. Johnson

In Overgaard v. Johnson,66 real estate buyers recovered damages from sellers because the tract the sellers sold them contained
less vineyard acreage than sales documents stated.67 After recovering
from the sellers, the buyers sued the real estate salesman and broker
he employed, arguing their negligence caused the loss.68 The trial
judge awarded benefit of the bargain damages.69 Both sides agreed
CCC § 3333 controlled on damages, but disagreed as to what damages were proper.70 The Fifth District began by noting that part of the
difficulty in analyzing the law “arises out of a veritable gallimaufry
of confusing rules gleaned from different types of actions.”71 The
court defined “benefit-of-the-bargain” as “the difference between the
actual value of what plaintiff has received and that which he expected
to receive.”72 It then defined “out-of-pocket” as “the difference between the actual value received and the actual value conveyed.”73
The court then observed that CCC § 3333 sets out a tort measure of
damages, namely damages which compensate a plaintiff for a loss
sustained rather than providing him, definitively, with the benefit of
any contract bargain.74
Citing Pepitone, the court explained that because the fraudulent breach of fiduciary duty is a tort, the defrauding fiduciary must
make good the full amount of the loss of which his breach of faith is
a cause.75 For that reason, damages are measured under CCC §§
3333 and 1709 which regulate tort compensation, generally, and
which tend to give the injured party the benefit of his bargain, attempting to place the injured party in the position he would have been
in had the contract been performed.76
66

137 Cal. Rptr. 412 (Ct. App. 5th Dist. 1977).
Id. at 413.
68
Id.
69
Id.
70
Id.
71
Overgaard, 137 Cal. Rptr. at 413.
72
Id.
73
Id.
74
Id. at 413-14.
75
Id. at 414 (“California law is committed to the view that the fraudulent breach of fiduciary duty is a tort . . . .” (quoting Pepitone, 134 Cal. Rptr. at 711)).
76
Overgaard, 137 Cal. Rptr. at 414 (cases amplify that CCC §§ 3333 and 1709 provide a
measure of damages substantially the same as for breach of contract prescribed by § 3300,
namely it tends to give the injured party the benefit of his bargain and insofar as possible to
67
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The Overgaard Court distinguished fiduciary fraud from fiduciary negligence cases, stating that even if CCC § 3333 were applicable, it does not, in all cases, require a benefit-of-the-bargain standard; rather, the court should have flexibility to determine the damage
measure so that, in certain cases, what amounts to a benefit of the
bargain measure can be applied in the judge’s discretion.77 The court
stated: “It is an anomaly that a negligent broker has no more to lose
than the amount which he gains by his negligent actions . . . it has
been a real ‘loss’ as far as the respondent is concerned.”78
Overgaard established three principles first, that the theory of
applicable damages in real estate broker cases depends on the relationship between the broker and customer (fiduciary or nonfiduciary).79 Second, that the quantum of applicable damages may
depend on the level of scienter motivating the alleged misconduct
(fraudulent, negligent or, possibly, somewhere in between, e.g., constructive fraud), and third, even in fraud cases applying CCC § 3333,
which had been interpreted as providing benefit of the bargain damages, such damages may not be appropriate, under CCC § 3333, even
in fiduciary breach cases under the “all detriment proximately
caused” language of CCC § 3333.80

place him in the same position he would have been had the promisor performed the contract); Pointe San Diego Residential Cmty., L.P. v. W.W.I. Properties, L.L.C., No. D044695,
2007 WL 1991205, at *6 (Cal. Ct. App. 4th Dist. July 11, 2007) (neither statute expressly
sets forth a benefit-of-the-bargain rule, but cases have noted § 3300 tends to give benefit-ofthe-bargain).
77
Id. at 415.
78
Id. at 416.
79
Id.
80
See Zarate, 2007 WL 1555808, at *2. In Zarate, the court stated:
[W]here the victim is defrauded by a fiduciary, damages are authorized
by [CCC §§] 1709 and 3333. Section 3333 does not specify any particular measure of damages. As Overgaard . . . clarified, “section 3333 does
not set forth any benefit of the bargain rule. That section simply sets out
the measure of damages long recognized in torts, namely, to compensate
a plaintiff for a loss sustained rather than give him the benefit of any
contract.” It is unclear whether the measure of damages under section
3333 would provide a benefit-of-the-bargain measure of damages in the
case of a fiduciary's intentional misrepresentation. It is settled, however,
that victims of fiduciary negligence are entitled to only the out-of-pocket
measure of damages. . . . Thus, with the possible exception of claims
against a fiduciary for intentional misrepresentation, courts do not have
broad flexibility to fashion a damage award in cases such as this. The
out-of-pocket measure applies.
Id. (quoting Overgaard, 137 Cal. Rptr. at 413).
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1978 - Walters v. Marler

In Walters v. Marler,81 plaintiff sued numerous parties for
damages in connection with their purchase of one parcel of a property
and home supposedly on it.82 The facts were particularly complicated. Due to the error of a county assessor, all improvements for a six
parcel property were allocated to the fourth parcel and, due to an erroneous survey, the house plaintiff purchased appeared to be located
entirely on the fourth parcel.83 Defendants, the Marlers, bought the
entire property for $95,000, through a sales person, Fickle, who was
employed by Rector, doing business as Action Realty Co.84 The
Marlers built an addition and listed the house as “one acre plus” for
$125,000 with Fickle, with Action and Fickle acting as seller’s broker.85
The Marlers told Fickle the “one acre plus” was the area immediately around the house but it was understood the exact boundaries needed to be defined by a survey.86 Plaintiff Walters contacted
Leseman, a broker with Lampliter Realty, and, through Leseman,
Walter told Fickle he would buy the property, but only if more land
was made available.87 Fickle told Walters the Marlers might sell the
entire fourth parcel, but there would have to be a survey.88 Leseman
said there was no time for a survey but asked what the fourth parcel
included.89 Fickle showed Leseman a plot map and marked the location of the improvements, in the fourth parcel boundaries.90
Leseman, misreading the erroneous map, mistakenly thought the top
of the map was north when it was, in fact, east, so Leseman incorrectly pointed out the property boundaries Walters.91 Walters and the
Marlers contracted to buy and sell the fourth parcel and its improvements for $105,000.92
81
82
83
84
85
86
87
88
89
90
91
92

147 Cal. Rptr. 655 (Ct. App. 1st Dist. 1978).
Id. at 661.
Id. at 663.
Id.
Id.
Walters, 147 Cal. Rptr. at 663.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Walters, 147 Cal. Rptr. at 663.
Id.
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Transamerica, then, at Fickle’s request, issued a preliminary
title report, which made no mention of any improvements.93 Walters
then obtained an $84,000 purchase money loan from Wells Fargo
Bank and gave a deed of trust covering the fourth parcel.94
Transamerica issued Walters a standard title insurance policy which,
as it happened, did not insure against facts not disclosed by public
records and which an accurate survey would disclose.95 Transamerica also issued to Wells Fargo an extended coverage policy which included relevant endorsements “100” and “116.”96 The 116 endorsement insured a house located on the fourth parcel and the 100
endorsement insured against loss due to any encroachment of the
house onto adjoining lands.97
Transamerica, however, neglected to inspect the property before issuing the policy to Wells Fargo.98 Walters learned the property
that Leseman had shown him was actually not his property and the
house would be close to the property line.99 When Walters had a survey prepared, he learned only a small portion of the house was on the
fourth parcel.100 At trial, Walters alleged numerous theories of recovery against the sellers, their brokers, his own brokers, and the insurers.101 He maintained he only bought the property because of defendant’s misrepresentations regarding the parcel boundaries.102
Defendants argued, inter alia, mutual mistake and negligence on
Walter’s part.103 A jury held for plaintiff in the amount of $105,000,
plus interest, plus punitive damages, and an appeal followed.104 The
appeal court began by stating that where a defrauding party stands in
a fiduciary relationship to the victim of fraud, damages must be
measured pursuant to CCC §§ 3333 and 1709, but that the cases were
in conflict as to the measure of damages.105 Pepitone, it noted, held
93
94
95
96
97
98
99
100
101
102
103
104
105

Id.
Id.
Id.
Walters, 147 Cal. Rptr. at 663.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Walters, 147 Cal. Rptr. at 664.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 677.
Id. at 670.
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these sections provide damages substantially the same as that for
breach of contract prescribed by § 3300; i.e., they tend to give the
party the benefit-of-the-bargain (or the difference between the actual
value of what he received and what he expected to receive), and insofar as possible to place him in the same position as he would have
been if the promisor performed the contract.106 Overgaard, it noted,
was contrary, holding CCC § 3333 does not set forth a benefit of the
bargain rule; rather, it just sets out the tort measure of damages,
namely, to compensate plaintiff for a loss, not to provide him the
benefit of any contract bargain.107
Because Leseman and Lampliter were Walters’ own real estate agents, the court held that they owed him a fiduciary duty to disclose all material facts that might affect his decision to purchase the
property and, therefore, that damages, as to them, would be governed
by CCC §§ 3333 and 1709.108 The Marlers and their own real estate
agents, Fickle, Rector and Action, were not Walters’ fiduciaries so
their liability for damages would be governed by the out-of-pocket
rule.109 Although the court found the trial judge had improperly
failed to provide separate measures of damages for defendants in a
fiduciary relationship and those who were not, it concluded that under either measure of damages the award was excessive.110
Under the out-of-pocket rule of CCC § 3343, Walters would
be entitled to recover the difference between the actual value of that
with which he parted ($105,000) and the market value of that which
he received ($23,500 to $24,500), or $80,500 to $81,500. Subsequent
expenditures for landscaping, property taxes, title insurance, property
insurance, interest on the loan, and maintenance and repair of the
property would not be recoverable. Because these expenditures
would have been made even if the property had been as represented,
they were not made in reliance on the fraudulent misrepresentations.
Under CCC § 3333, Walters could only recover an amount sufficient
to compensate him for his losses resulting from reliance on the fraud,
which was equal to the difference between the market value of what
he received ($23,500 to $24,500) and what he expected to receive

106
107
108
109
110

Walters, 147 Cal. Rptr. at 670.
Id.
Id. at 670-71.
Id.
Id.
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($105,000) or $80,500 to $81,500.111 The appeal court rejected plaintiff’s damage claim seeking cost of repair of the property because it
concluded those expenditures would have been made even if the
property had been as it was represented.112 The court disregarded the
fact no repairs would have been necessary because plaintiff would
not have bought the property, had defendants not made the misrepresentations.113
Walters illustrates how courts carefully analyze the relationship between real estate brokers and the persons they represent to determine what statutory damages are available. It illustrates the rule
that if a court concludes certain costs would have been incurred even
if the property was in the condition it was represented to be in, plaintiff may not recover such costs. The Walters court did not provide
any analysis as to why the loss of a contract bargain proximately
caused by a fiduciary’s misconduct would not be a “detriment,” for
purposes of computing statutory damages, nor why loss of contract
bargain would not be subsumed within the broad language “all detriment proximately caused.”
IV.

THE 1980S—ESTATE OF ANDERSON AND CORY V. VILLA
A.

1983 - Estate of Anderson

Estate of Anderson114 involved a bank which was named as
executor and trustee of an estate which had been given discretionary
authority, in both capacities, to sell estate property. 115 Without advising plaintiff beneficiaries, the bank sold 1330 acres of land, the estate’s principal asset.116 The trial court held that in selling the land,
the bank breached its fiduciary relationship by failing to disclose material information to the beneficiaries, including the sale, finding it
guilty of tortious nondisclosure.117 The trial court awarded full “market appreciation damages,” through the date of trial, based upon the

111
112
113
114
115
116
117

Walters, 147 Cal. Rptr. at 671.
Id. at 672-73
Id. at 673.
196 Cal. Rptr. 782 (Ct. App. 1st Dist. 1983).
Id. at 785.
Id.
Id. at 794-95.
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trial date value of the property.118
The appeal court sustained the damages, noting appellant
breached its fiduciary duty of loyalty, including its duty to fully inform the beneficiaries of material information regarding the sale of
property, rejecting the argument that California law did not provide
for such damages or that simple legal interest could make plaintiffs
whole.119 Full market appreciation, through trial, was justified, it
held, because the sale prevented plaintiffs from realizing their expectancy interest under CCC § 3333—”Further support can be found in
the general tort measure of damages found in Civil Code section
3333 since this case presents elements of tortious nondisclosure and
fraud . . . the use of an 8.5 percent annual appreciation figure was in
accord with substantial justice, being reasonable and consistent with
the marketplace . . . .”120
The Anderson plaintiffs’ expectancy included all appreciation
the property would have experienced if it were available to be sold on
the date of trial.121 Such an award represents an implicit “market adjusted” damage approach in looking to what plaintiffs’ financial situation should have been, on the date of trial, if plaintiffs had available
for sale what they were supposed to have had, i.e., a saleable property.122 In other words, the Anderson plaintiffs expected to enjoy the
full appreciation of the then California real estate market, as owners
of their property, and as its sellers. They could not realize that expectation because, in breach of duty and through fraudulent nondisclosure, their fiduciaries had previously sold the property.123 The
“index” the court used to market-adjust plaintiffs’ financial position
was the California real estate market in which their property was appreciating, through the date of trial, and damages, under CCC § 3333,
were a benefit-of-the-bargain recovery, quantified through property
appreciation, functioning as that market index.124
118

Id.
See Anderson, 196 Cal. Rptr. at 794.
120
See Anderson, 196 Cal. Rptr. at 795.
121
See Boyle v. Sosnowski, No. A103494, 2004 WL 569871, at *2 (Cal. Ct. App. 1st
Dist. Mar. 23, 2004) (“expectancy interest” includes “lost property appreciation”).
122
See generally Laurence A. Steckman & Robert E. Conner, Computing Damages in
Rule 10b-5 Unsuitability Cases: Litigating “Offset” Defenses, reprinted in 1994 SEC.
ARBITRATION 377, 392-405 (P.L.I. 1994) (discussing the calculation of market index adjusted damages under Second Circuit precedent).
123
Anderson, 195 Cal. Rptr. at 795.
124
Id.
119

https://digitalcommons.tourolaw.edu/lawreview/vol31/iss4/19

20

Steckman et al.: Expectancy-Based Damages

2015

EXPECTANCY-BASED DAMAGES

1063

Anderson was a trust case that involved a sale of property, rather than a standard real estate fraud case.125 What is notable, however, is that the court looked to CCC § 3333; a broad, general statute
whose remedies are not restricted to any particular type of cases.126
Dual agents and buyer’s brokers are not deemed to be merely fiduciaries, but, under California law, are deemed to be trustees of their
customers.127 Buyer’s brokers are trustees so there is even more reason to hold them to their representations by awarding full expectancy
damages.128
Anderson established three key principles, first that market
appreciation damages may be awarded under California law to realize
the expectancy interests of persons defrauded by their fiduciaries.129
Second, that the quantum of appreciation may be determined by examining the percentage increase of similar properties in the same geographical region and, third, that the courts attempting to determine
the appropriate quantum of market appreciation may use the date of
trial, not the date the injury occurred or the date of notice of the
wrongdoing, as a benchmark.130 In other words, because plaintiffs
were entitled to and expected to have a property they could monetize
at a time of their choosing, the broad provisions of § 3333 would put
in them in the same economic position they would have been in, as of
the trial date.
B.

1986 - Cory v. Villa Properties

In Cory v. Villa Properties,131 purchasers of realty brought action against vendors and vendors’ broker for fraud, intentional and
negligent misrepresentation.132 Defendants prevailed on summary
judgment and the buyers appealed.133 The appeal court held, inter
alia, that defendants’ misrepresentation that the property was 2.8
125

Id. at 785.
Id. at 795.
127
See Ford, 111 Cal. Rptr. at 340 (“It is well settled in this state that a law imposes on a
real estate broker the same obligation of undivided service and loyalty that it imposes on a
trustee in favor of his beneficiary.”).
128
Anderson, 195 Cal. Rptr. at 795.
129
Id.
130
Id.
131
225 Cal. Rptr. 628 (Ct. App. 2d Dist. 1986).
132
Id. at 629.
133
Id.
126
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acres, when it was really 1.8 acres, was actionable fraud against both
the seller and its (licensed) broker; and that the exclusive measure of
damages for fraud was out-of-pocket loss plus specified additional
damages.134 The court justified its analysis by providing “a bit of
background”:
Until 1935, California Civil Code section 3333 provided the general rule regarding the measure of damages for recovery in tort, that being that the amount to
be compensated would be for all the detriment proximately caused which principle was called the “benefit
of the bargain rule.” Recognizing that the “benefit of
the bargain” rule was an extreme rule, the Supreme
Court stated that “[I]t should . . . be applied only in
clear cases and upon just terms.” The Legislature responded in 1935 by the passage of Civil Code section
3343 and the Supreme Court in Bagdasarian v. Gragnon, 192 P.2d 935 (Cal. 1948), concluded that this
statute provided the exclusive measure of damages
thereby eliminating entirely the possibility of recovery
based upon the “benefits of the bargain” measure.135
The Cory court continued:
In [Bagdasarian], the Supreme Court recognized that
“[t]he right to recover additional damages does not refer to the measure of damages, but, rather, to such
matters as expenses or consequential injury resulting
from the fraud.” Hence, this interpretation is in accord
with the general rule that a defrauded plaintiff may recover for all the detriment proximately caused, which
must necessarily include necessary expenses and indirect injuries caused by the fraud. . . . The Supreme
Court then went on to elaborate on the recovery of expenditures by explaining that “[e]xpenditures which
were reasonable under the circumstances, . . . may ordinarily be recovered, insofar as they have been lost or
rendered fruitless because of the deceit.” Hence, the
134

Id. The court noted that the licensed broker and seller were more knowledgeable than
the buyer and that the difference in acreage was not obvious to the buyer on a visual inspection.
135
Id. at 631-32.
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California statutory law follows the out of pocket rule.
. . . Civil Code § 3343 which states the rule of damage
recovery for actions in fraud, awards the difference
between what the defrauded party has expended and
what he has received in value, plus additional damages
arising from the transaction.136
In determining out-of-pocket damages, the court noted that the property was purchased for $705,000 on March 7, 1980 and that its role,
first, was to look to the actual value of the property on that date.137
There was no appraisal of the property to support any valuation as of
that date other than the purchase price, itself.138 The trial court considered a number of appraisals made a little more than a year after the
sale, the affidavit of the appellant Josephine Cory in the bankruptcy
action stating that the realty had a value of $1,230,000 as well as the
Finding of Fact of the bankruptcy judge that the lot with the house
had a value on February 10, 1982, of $850,000 exclusive of the additional unimproved lot.139 Appellants alleged they would not have
bought the property had they known the property’s actual size.140
The sellers and their broker presented appraisals to the court and the
buyers submitted no competent evidence to refute the values alleged.141
Despite the fact that the appraisals considered the value a year
after the sale, the court found that the change of value between the
time of appraisal and trial went merely to evidentiary weight.142
Finding no out-of-pocket loss, the court concluded other types of
compensable damage might still exist, including possible lost profits
damages or gains reasonably anticipated from subdividing and selling
the acreage which appellants thought they purchased.143

136
137
138
139
140
141
142
143

Cory, 225 Cal. Rptr. at 631-632.
Id. at 633.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Cory, 225 Cal. Rptr. at 633.
Id.
Id.
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THE 1990S—SALAHUTDIN, ALLIANCE MORTGAGE AND
ONOFRIO
A.

1994 - Salahutdin v. Valley of California, Inc.

In Salahutdin v. Valley of California, Inc.,144 a property purchaser sued Coldwell Banker for the misrepresentations of its brokeremployee, Siegel, concerning the boundaries of a property and the
buyer’s ability to subdivide to induce plaintiff’s purchase.145 Siegel
had accepted the seller’s agent’s representations as to size, looked at
the multiple listing sheet and “eyeballed” the property before representing to plaintiffs it was “more than an acre.”146 He did not, however, tell the buyers that he had not independently confirmed the
property size nor whether it could be subdivided by the buyers.147
Plaintiff sued for negligent misrepresentation for, inter alia, defendants’ concealment of its failure to adequately investigate or disclose
the true facts.148
Expert testimony confirmed the broker had an obligation to
not merely accept the seller’s representation as to the property size
and to “eyeball,” but to either confirm the accuracy of that statement
or at least advise plaintiffs he had done nothing to establish the accuracy of this information.149 The trial court applied § 3333 and computed damages by comparing the value of the property plaintiffs received and the value of the property they would have received had
the broker’s representations been true, which it referred to as a “benefit of the bargain” measure.150 The court accepted plaintiffs’ appraiser’s testimony that as of November, 1991, the date nearest trial, the
fair market value of comparable property that could be subdivided
would be $1,100,000 and the value of the subject property, given
there was only a remote possibility that a variance could be obtained
in the future to allow subdivision, was $925,000.151 The trial court,
as in Anderson, examined the value of the property by asking what a
144
145
146
147
148
149
150
151

29 Cal. Rptr. 2d 463 (Ct. App. 1st Dist. 1994).
Id. at 464.
Id. at 465.
Id.
Id.
Salahutdin, 29 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 465-66.
Id.
Id. at 466.
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property with the characteristics represented would have had on the
date of trial, awarding the difference between what plaintiffs should
have been able to realize as of the trial date and what plaintiffs actually received, as a result of fiduciary misconduct.152
On appeal, the court began by explaining that the broker’s liability was not predicated on a breach of CCC § 2079 for a breach of
the broker’s inspection and disclosure which requires a reasonably
competent and diligent “visual” inspection and disclosure to a prospective purchaser of “all facts materially affecting the value or desirability of the property that such an investigation would reveal.”153
Absent “red flags” visible from a reasonably diligent visual inspection indicating the property was not the size represented, that duty
would not encompass a duty to survey the property to make sure it
was the size represented.154 However, what was really at issue was
the broker’s fiduciary duty to his own client to refrain from making
representations of fact material to the client’s decision to buy the
property without advising that he was merely passing on information
received from the seller, without verifying it.155
The court explained that under the doctrine of constructive
fraud, a fiduciary is liable to his principal even if his conduct is not
actually fraudulent.156 Constructive fraud is a unique species of fraud
applicable only to a fiduciary or one in a confidential relationship and
breach of a fiduciary duty, the court noted, usually constitutes “constructive fraud.”157 The failure of the fiduciary to disclose a fact to
his principal which might reasonably be expected to affect the fiduciary’s motives or the principal’s decision, which fact is known (or
should be known) to the fiduciary, may constitute constructive fraud,
as can even a careless misstatement.158 A broker who acts as an innocent conduit of a seller’s fraud may be innocent of fraud, but liable
on a constructive fraud theory if he or she passes on the misstatements as true without personally investigating them or disclosing that
the information has not been verified because the principal has a right

152
153
154
155
156
157
158

Id.
Id. at 466 n.3.
Salahutdin, 29 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 465-66.
Id.
Id. at 466.
Id.
Id.
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to rely on the broker’s statements.159
Siegal was required to refrain from advising his clients that
the parcel was more than an acre and could therefore be subdivided,
and that the fence represented the southern boundary of the property
where he did not know that to be the case.160 Although he was not
required to investigate the sellers’ representations or the truth of the
description contained in the multiple listing service sheet before
showing the property to plaintiffs, he was required to tell plaintiffs he
had not verified the information he was passing on to them and that
he was actually relying on the description the sellers provided.161
Although the court noted that there is no clear line establishing when
a fiduciary’s breach of the duty of care will be merely negligent and
when it may be characterized as constructive fraud, it did note a
breach of a fiduciary duty usually constitutes constructive fraud.162
On appeal, the court observed that the cases on the measure of
damages were not consistent in their treatment of the measure of
damages for breach of fiduciary duty, citing examples of the courts
taking confusing and conflicting positions.163 The court observed that
the consensus of courts and commentators found that although CCC §
3343, the out-of-pocket measure, governs the measure of damages for
fraud in the purchase, sale or exchange of real property, an exception
is recognized where a fiduciary relationship existed between the parties, in which case CCC §§ 3333 and1709 govern.164 The court further observed that commentators had identified a split in authority regarding the measure of damages in fiduciary fraud cases. 165 First,
159

Salahutdin, 29 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 465-66.
Id. at 466.
161
Id.
162
Id. at 466-67.
163
It cited as examples: Gagne v. Bertan, 275 P.2d. 15 (Cal. 1954), which cited CCC §
3333, rather than § 3343 in support of the “out-of-pocket” standard in a case not involving a
fiduciary, Ford, 111 Cal. Rptr. at 331, and Burkhouse, 96 Cal. Rptr. at 198, involving fiduciaries, both of which relied on CCC § 3343 to support an award of more expansive damages
than available under the “out-of-pocket” standard under § 3343. It noted that Simone v.
McKee, 298 P.2d 667 (Cal. 1956), supports a broad measure of damages exceeding the “outof-pocket” standard by reliance primarily upon CCC § 3333, but stated § 3343 would also
support such award. In Savage v. Mayer, 203 P.2d 9 (Cal. 1949) and Simone, the court observed that the damages awarded included disgorging of secret profits by the fiduciary, but
that in Walsh v. Hooker & Fay, 28 Cal. Rptr. 16, 22-23 (Ct. App. 1st Dist. 1963), the same
court held that the award of the broader measure of damages under § 3333 was not limited to
the secret profit situation.
164
Salahutdin, 29 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 468.
165
Id. at 468-69 (citing cases and commentators).
160
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cases adopting a benefit-of-the-bargain-approach166 and second,
courts holding that § 3333 limits the defrauded principal’s recovery
to the extent of financial injury sustained and does not authorize the
plaintiff to recover the benefit of his or her bargain.167 The court cited commentators who attempted to explain the division by distinguishing between actions by a principal against his agent for fraud (in
which the measure of damages for fiduciary fraud is the broader
“benefit of the bargain” rule) and actions for negligence, which apply
the “out-of-pocket” measure.168
The case was further complicated because although the parties
agreed § 3333 was applicable against a fiduciary, the case was tried
on a negligence theory against the broker and was complicated,
again, by the fact that the issue seemed to be turning on whether the
case was pleaded as a negligent misrepresentation case or a constructive fraud case; a question of pleading, rather than substantive damage theory.169
Recognizing the split in views, the Salahutdin Court chose to
follow Division 2 courts that apply the broader measure of damages
and it refused to limit damages to the out-of-pocket measure.170 The
appeal court affirmed the trial court’s decision to calculate benefit of
the bargain damages based on the date of discovery of the wrongdoing, rather than the transaction date.171 Distinguishing out-of-pocket
awards, which are usually calculated as of the transaction date, the
court observed that benefit of the bargain damages may appropriately
be calculated as of the date of discovery of the fraud.172 The court
stated, “Applying the difference as of the date of the transaction
166

Id. at 468; see, e.g., Pepitone, 134 Cal. Rptr. at 709; Walsh, 28 Cal. Rptr. at 16; Simone, 298 P.2d at 667; Lund v. Albrecht, 936 F.2d 459 (9th Cir. 1991); Stout, 586 P.2d 1228
(affirming award of broader remedy for fiduciary fraud as “consequential” or “additional”
damages under CCC § 3343).
167
Salahutdin, 29 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 468-69; see, e.g., Walters, 147 Cal. Rptr. at 655; Overgaard, 137 Cal. Rptr. at 412.
168
Salahutdin, 29 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 469 (“2 MILLER & STARR, CALIFORNIA REAL ESTATE §
3.23, at 134-35, 137-38 (2d ed. 1989); see Timothy O'Leary, Limiting the Fiduciary Duty
Exception to the Out-of-Pocket Rule, 16 REAL PROP. L. REP. 145, 145-47 (Cont. Ed. Bar,
April 1993). That distinction led MILLER & STARR to explain Overgaard and Christiansen v.
Roddy, 231 Cal. Rptr. 72 (Ct. App. 5th Dist. 1986), which rely on CCC § 3333 while applying the “out-of-pocket” loss rule, as decisions based on the negligence of the fiduciary and
not upon actual or constructive fraud. (2 MILLER & STARR, supra, § 3.23, at 138 n.27).
169
Salahutdin, 29 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 469.
170
Id. at 469-70.
171
Id. at 470.
172
Id. at 470-71.
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would defeat the goal of compensation for the entire loss where, as
here, discovery of the fiduciary’s constructive fraud did not occur until years after purchase of the property.”173
Aside from its careful detailing of the authority split on damages and interpretation of § 3333 regarding bargain damages, Salahutdin made clear its determination to apply bargain damages traced
to policies underlying CCC §§ 3333 and 1709.174 It made clear that
although the distinction between fiduciary negligence and fraud was
important, its implications remained unclear given the doctrine of
constructive fraud in California’s fiduciary law.175 It relied on the
“common-thread” among fiduciary wrongdoing cases, i.e., the principle that the “faithless fiduciary” must “make good the full amount
of the loss of which his breach of faith is a cause.”176 Section 3333
requires the defrauding fiduciary to make plaintiff whole for “all the
detriment proximately caused”—and the loss of one’s contract bargain seems fairly characterized as a “detriment.”177
B.

1995 - Alliance Mortgage Co. v. Rothwell

In Alliance Mortgage Co. v. Rothwell,178 a lender sued a real
estate broker, title insurers and others for losses sustained when it
made loans to fictitious borrowers in reliance on defendant misrepresentations.179 Plaintiff alleged defendants prepared false residential
purchase agreements and loan applications in the names of fictitious
borrowers and deliberately inflated the “fair market value” property
appraisals, inventing “comparable property” valuations to support the
inflated and fraudulent appraisals.180 They also allegedly falsified
employment and deposit verifications, tax returns, credit histories,

173

Id. The court distinguished cases applying different damage theories in the context of
negligent damage to real property in which damage could be repaired so recoveries were
limited to the cost of repair or diminution in value, but not both. The court stated: “a rule
that would allow diminution in value to be awarded when it exceeds the cost of repair does
not fit within underlying tort doctrines. That case did not address the measure of damages
for fraud and breach of duty by a fiduciary.” Id. at 471.
174
Salahutdin, 29 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 469.
175
Id. at 469-70.
176
Id. at 470.
177
Id.
178
900 P.2d 601 (Cal. 1995).
179
Id.
180
Id. at 604.
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and W-2 wage/income statements.181 They also allegedly drafted inaccurate title reports that contained misleading descriptions of the
properties in issue and falsely represented that escrow instructions
had been followed, when they were not, and that required cash deposits and disbursements were made, when this had not occurred. 182 Defendants misrepresentations regarding the properties’ characteristics
and values induced Alliance to make loans which far exceeded the
properties’ actual worth at the time the loans were made.183
The trial court dismissed the lender’s cause of action but the
appellate court reversed.184 The California Supreme Court held that
lender’s purchase of property by full credit bid at a non-judicial foreclosure sale did not preclude it from maintaining a fraud action
against third-party, non-borrowers who fraudulently induced the
lender to make the loans.185 The court noted that despite the case involving intentional fraud, the appellate court applied Salahutdin, a
“negligent misrepresentation” case, that awarded bargain-based damages, stating:
The Court of Appeal here, relying on its earlier opinion in Salahutdin v. Valley of California, Inc., concluded that the appropriate measure of damages for
fraud by a fiduciary under section 3333 was the benefit-of-the-bargain rule. Salahutdin, however, involved
the measure of damages for a fiduciary’s negligent
misrepresentation. We have previously held that a
plaintiff is only entitled to its actual or “out-of-pocket”
losses suffered because of fiduciary’s negligent misrepresentation under § 3333.186
The Supreme Court thus appeared critical of both the appellate
court’s reliance on Salahutdin and of Salahutdin’s reliance on §
3333 to award bargain-based damages in a negligence case, contrary
holdings it seemed to believe mandated application of the out-ofpocket rule. The Supreme Court suggested § 3333 damages might be
greater for a fiduciary’s intentional misrepresentation, but declined to

181
182
183
184
185
186

Id.
Id.
Alliance, 900 P.2d at 605.
Id. at 603-04.
Id. at 616.
Id.
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address the issue.187 Salahutdin, however, made clear its application
of § 3333 was not based only on the fact that negligent misconduct
had been alleged, but because negligent fiduciary misconduct, almost
always, amounts to constructive fraud, under California law.188 The
question, then, was whether a non-intentional misrepresentation
equivalent to “constructive fraud” should be treated, for damage purposes, in the same way intentional fraud by a fiduciary is treated (i.e.,
subject to bargain-based damages under § 3333) or as negligent conduct (subject to out-of-pocket damages). Alliance, not addressing the
constructive fraud issue, identified the issue as whether intentional
fraud would be subject to heightened damages, but found resolution
of that issue unnecessary.189
C.

1997 - Onofrio v. Rice

In Onofrio v. Rice,190 a mortgagor sued a foreclosure consultant for violations of his duty as real estate broker and consultant
when he and his wife, through a series of unethical and illegal acts,
managed to buy plaintiff’s property at foreclosure sale conducted
pursuant to a notice of default on a deed of trust.191 Applying CCC §
2945.6, which provides an owner may bring an action against a foreclosure consultant for violation of the statute, along with exemplary
damages, the court calculated actual damages based on difference between what the foreclosure consultant caused plaintiff to pay for her
property at foreclosure sale and the property’s market value, awarding plaintiff $65,174 actual damages and $195,523 exemplary damages.192 The appeal court, finding no cases defining the standard by
which § 2945.6 actual damages are to be determined, found bargain
based damages justified by Salahutdin and Woosley v. Edwards,193
and affirmed the damage measure.194

187

Id. (“While the measure of damages under section 3333 might be greater for a fiduciary's intentional misrepresentation, we need not address that issue here. . . . The question
before us is whether Alliance stated a fraud claim.”).
188
Salahutdin, 29 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 469.
189
Alliance, 900 P.2d at 604.
190
64 Cal. Rptr. 2d 74 (Ct. App. 4th Dist. 1997).
191
Id. at 75-76.
192
Id. at 79-80.
193
117 B.R. 524 (Bankr. 9th Cir. 1990).
194
Onofrio, 64 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 79.

https://digitalcommons.tourolaw.edu/lawreview/vol31/iss4/19

30

Steckman et al.: Expectancy-Based Damages

2015
VI.

EXPECTANCY-BASED DAMAGES

1073

THE 2000S—HENSLEY, FRAGALE, STREBEL, AND POINTE
A.

2001 - Hensley v. McSweeney

In Hensley v. McSweeney,195 a prospective purchaser of property whose agreement for purchase had fallen through brought suit
against escrow agent who had held checks issued by purchaser in
connection with transaction, asserting various tort claims.196 Hensley
alleged fiduciary and non-fiduciary causes of action both of which
were submitted to a jury.197 The trial court instructed the jury with
California Civil Jury Instructions (“BAJI”) No. 12.56, which sets
forth the out-of-pocket damages rule, and BAJI No. 12.57, which defines the benefit of the bargain damages rule.198 The Hensley Court
began by distinguishing the rules applicable in fraud and negligence
cases noting that fraud cases involving the purchase, sale, or exchange of property, the out-of-pocket measure applied, under CCC §
3343, that the same rule applied with regard to a fiduciary’s negligent
misrepresentation, and that the question of the proper measure of
damages for intentional fraud by a fiduciary was not determined by
Alliance.199
Although the law, the court held, was unclear as to the proper
measure of damages, it also noted that the court had issued at least
two published opinions to the effect that the measure of damages for
fraud by a fiduciary is out-of-pocket damages, not the benefit of the
bargain computation normally applicable to contract causes of action.200 The parties had acknowledged a split of authority among the
appellate courts with respect to the measure of damages for intentional fraud by a fiduciary, that the California Supreme Court had not yet
definitively decided the issue and that Overgaard had questioned the
applicability of BAJI No. 12.57 to instances where the defrauding
party stands in a fiduciary capacity to the defrauded party because the
cases cited in the Use Note in BAJI did not support this proposition.201 Hensley distinguished Salahutdin:
195
196
197
198
199
200
201

109 Cal. Rptr. 2d 489 (Ct. App. 5th Dist. 2001).
Id. at 490-91.
Id. at 491.
Id. at 491-92.
Id. at 492.
Hensley, 109 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 491-92.
Id. at 492 (citing Overgaard, 137 Cal. Rptr. at 415-17).
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Although the court in Salahutdin applied the broader
benefit of the bargain measure of damages, it
acknowledged that the facts in Salahutdin were substantially similar to the Overgaard case in that both
cases were tried on a negligence theory against the
broker. Onofrio applied the benefit of the bargain
measure of damages to a statutory cause of action pursuant to Civil Code section 2945.6 against a foreclosure consultant. Neither Salahutdin nor Onofrio are
binding on this court.202
The Hensley Court concluded it was bound by Overgaard and it
adopted an out-of-pocket measure of damages, expressly stating that
given the absence of contrary authority from the Supreme Court, it
would not depart from its long-standing decision in Overgaard, nor
depart from Overgaard’s observations regarding application of BAJI
No. 12.57.203 It held the appropriate measure of damages, even in fiduciary tort actions, would be the out-of-pocket measure, not the
benefit of the bargain measure.204
B.

2003 - Fragale v. Faulkner

In Fragale v. Faulkner,205 buyers, the Fragales, sued seller,
Faulkner, and real estate broker, Messing, for intentional and negligent misrepresentation, seeking benefit-of-the-bargain damages for
their misconduct in the sale of a residential home.206 Messing represented both parties in the transaction, a dual, inherently conflicted
representation.207 The Fragales alleged that defendants falsely represented that no structural defects or safety problems existed with respect to a laundry room and addition to the house, which was constructed without permits.208 In fact, there were defects in the
addition, defective interior walls, electrical wiring and other problems, hidden behind seller-installed paneling, which the Fragales dis-

202
203
204
205
206
207
208

Id. at 492.
Id.
Id.
1 Cal. Rptr. 3d 616 (Ct. App. 2d Dist. 2003).
Id. at 618.
Id.
Id. at 618-19.
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covered just after the purchase.209
On a Transfer Disclosure Statement, boxes indicated “[r]oom
additions, structural modifications or other alterations or repairs made
without necessary permits . . . not in compliance with building
codes.”210 In response to buyer’s questions, Faulkner wrote:
“[l]aundry room, bonus room, MBR closet, no permits. Doorway can
be closed if necessary from bonus room to BR.”211 Messing did not
instruct the seller to provide further disclosure.212
Messing had several further discussions with Fragale about
the lack of permits, explaining they were built without someone
“pulling a building permit.”213 The Fragales inspection company reported no major defects, but noted the lack of permits.214 Fragale,
concerned about what was under the paneling, sent a list of questions
to Faulkner and asked, as to the “unpermitted closet and laundry
room,” whether the current owners made the improvements.215 The
buyers responded they bought house without permits.216 In response
to the question whether the rooms were basically built to code without permits, Faulkner responded that he was not sure.217 Faulkner responded “no” to the question whether there were any structural deficiencies that might be a safety concern that should be addressed upon
taking possession.218 Fragale told Messing he needed to know the
condition of the walls behind the paneling, and Messing told him that
he had contacted the Faulkners and they said the walls were fine, that
anything that might need to be done would be cosmetic and that the
paneling could be taken off and the walls painted, and that there was
just wall behind the paneling.219
Fragale testified he knew the bonus room and laundry room
were not permitted, and he talked to Messing about what this meant
and whether the rooms were built to Code, but just not permitted.220
209
210
211
212
213
214
215
216
217
218
219
220

Id. at 619-20.
Fragale, 1 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 619 (emphsis added).
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Fragale, 1 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 619.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Fragale, 1 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 619.
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Messing told him not to worry about it, that there was no problem
and that they would be fine for another twenty years.221 After the
Fragales took possession, they removed the paneling and found that
major alterations had been concealed, including removal of plasterboard, false ceilings and walls, and dangling electrical wires.222 The
Fragales’ expert testified the cost of repair, including demolition of
the structurally defective bonus room, would be $80,000.223
After plaintiff’s case, Messing and Faulkner moved for nonsuit.224 Messing’s motion contended the Fragales offered no admissible evidence of diminution in the value of the property, as required
under CCC § 3343.225 The Fragales moved to reopen their case to allow Fragale to testify as to the value of the property, and to amend
the pleadings to state a cause of action for fiduciary breach. 226 The
trial court ruled diminution of value had not been established and denied the Fragales’s motion to reopen so Fragale could testify on that
issue.227 The court denied Messing’s motion for nonsuit and allowed
the case to go to the jury on subparagraph 2 of BAJI 12.56, namely,
the cost of the repair.228 The court instructed the jury as follows:
The amount of such award shall include, number one,
the difference, if any, between the actual value of that
with which the plaintiff parted and the actual value of
that which was received. This is sometimes referred
to as the out-of-pocket loss. . . . Number 2, in addition
to out-of-pocket loss, if any, plaintiff is entitled to recover any additional damage arising from the particular transaction, including an amount which could
compensate the plaintiff for loss of use and enjoyment
of the property to the extent that any such loss is
caused by the fraud.229
The jury returned special verdicts against Messing and Faulkner,
finding each of them liable for intentional misrepresentation and neg221
222
223
224
225
226
227
228
229

Id. at 619
Id. at 620.
Id.
Id.
Fragale, 1 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 620.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 620 n.3.
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ligent misrepresentation, and awarded damages against each on both
causes of action.230 On the intentional misrepresentation claim
against Messing, the jury found the total amount of all damages suffered was $19,000; the same question on the negligent misrepresentation claim against Messing elicited an answer of $12,000.231 The
same questions as to Faulkner elicited answers of $8,000 in each
case.232 Messing moved for a judgment notwithstanding the verdict
arguing the Fragales offered no evidence of an intentional misrepresentation and no evidence of the value of the property at the time of
transfer.233 The court held there was no evidence of what the market
value of the property would have been had the true facts been known
regarding the lack of permits and the lack of compliance with the
building code and, for that reason, held that the Fragales failed to
show damages within the meaning of CCC § 3343.234 The Fragales
appealed.235
The Court of Appeals held that because of the dual agency,
Faulkner owed fiduciary duties to buyer.236 It held damages for fiduciary fraud are measured under CCC § 3333, rather than CCC § 3343,
and that the measure of damages for a fiduciary’s intentional misrepresentation is not confined to out-of-pocket losses.237 In cases of
fraud by a fiduciary the broader measure of damages provided by
CCC §§ 1709 and 3333 apply, including compensation “for all the
detriment proximately caused” under § 3333, and “any damage” the
defrauded party suffers, under CCC § 1709.238 The Fragale Court relied on Salahutdin, stating “the remedy afforded by sections 1709 and
3333 aims at compensation for any and all the detriment proximately
caused by the breach.”239 The court continued:
One who willfully deceives another with intent to induce him to alter his position to his injury or risk, is
liable for any damage which he thereby suffers. In an

230
231
232
233
234
235
236
237
238
239

Fragale, 1 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 620.
Id.
Id. at 620-21 n.4.
Id. at 620.
Id. at 620-21.
Fragale, 1 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 621.
Id.
Id. at 621-22 (citing Alliance, 900 P.2d. at 610).
Id. at 623.
Id.
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action by a principal against an agent arising from the
agent’s fraud, these two principles have been interpreted as providing a measure of damages based on
the broader ‘benefit-of-the-bargain’ rule because a fiduciary should be responsible to compensate his or
her principal for the full amount of the loss caused by
his or her breach of duty.240
The Second District fashioned a bargain-based remedy to enable
plaintiffs’ expectancy interest to be realized through a repair-costbased money damage award.241 Because the Fragales presented evidence of their repair costs, the award of such costs placed the buyers
in the position they would have enjoyed if Messing’s false representation were true and enabled the buyers to place the property in the
condition they believed existed at the time of purchase.242 The buyers
thus obtained their bargain through damages, equitable in the circumstances which compensated them for all the “detriment proximately
caused” by Messing’s misrepresentation.243 From the perspective of
realized expectancy, the Fragale award was similar to the Anderson
and Salahutdin awards.
On appeal, the Court of Appeal first addressed plaintiffs’
claim for negligent misrepresentation, concluding that the out-ofpocket rule would control, under Alliance Mortgage.244 However, a
different result followed from the Fragales’ claim against Messing for
intentional misrepresentation. Joining courts that adopted the broader
measure of damages for fiduciary fraud, the Fragale court concluded
that damages should not be limited to out-of-pocket losses.245 Rather,
the result consonant with the principle that “the faithless fiduciary
240

Fragale, 1 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 623 (quoting 2 MILLER & STARR, supra note 168, at 19091) (emphasis added).
241
Id. at 623-24.
242
Id.
243
Repair costs are unavailable, however, where they are not traceable to the misrepresentation at issue. See, e.g., Walters, 147 Cal. Rptr. at 670-71 (where property was purchased
based on misrepresentations regarding its boundaries, the appellate court rejected the plaintiff's claim of damages for repair of the property because those expenditures would have
been made even if the property had been as it was represented to be, noting repair costs are
not recoverable where they “constitute improvements of the property” and their cost is not
“lost or rendered fruitless” as a result of the deceit; the court also rejected plaintiff’s claims
for the cost of landscaping, property taxes, title insurance, property insurance, interest on the
loan, and maintenance).
244
Fragale, 1 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 622-23.
245
Id. at 622.
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shall make good the full amount of the loss of which his breach of
faith is a cause, and citing Salahutdin, refused to be constrained by
the out-of pocket rule.246 Acknowledging authorities were not uniform on whether a measure of damages other than out-of-pocket losses should be applied in a case of an intentional misrepresentation by a
fiduciary and that since Alliance Mortgage, the Hensley Court, concluded that out-of-pocket loss is the appropriate measure of damages
for intentional fraud by a fiduciary,247 the Fragale court observed that
Hensley did not discuss the propriety of distinguishing intentional
from negligent fiduciary misrepresentations.248
The Second District, in Fragale, expressly rejected the Fifth
District’s ruling in Hensley.249 Instead, it held that the “preferable
view” is that damages for fraud by a fiduciary should not be limited
to out-of-pocket losses.250 The Fragale court, discussing Salahutdin,
noted that the case pre-dated the statement in Alliance that only outof-pocket losses may be recovered where a fiduciary engages in negligent misrepresentation but while Salahutdin was tried on a negligent misrepresentation theory, the trial court had also held that the real estate agent committed constructive fraud.251 For that reason, it
refused to limit damages to plaintiffs’ out-of-pocket loss and, instead,
permitted a bargain-based measure, under CCC § 3333, comparing
the value of plaintiffs’ property with the value of comparable property that could be subdivided.252
Fragale presented claims of both intentional and negligent
misrepresentation and there was sufficient evidence of “recklessness”
to permit a jury to conclude “intentional misconduct” had occurred—
in other words, the jury could conclude, as it apparently did, that
Messing had made representations recklessly without knowing
whether they were true or false. He had testified that he discussed
with Faulkner “whether or not there were any conditions existing on
the property that were not built to code,” that the discussion referred
to the laundry room and bonus room both built without permits, and

246
247
248
249
250
251
252

Id.
Id. at 622-23.
Id.
Fragale, 1 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 623.
Id.
Id. at 623-24.
Id. at 623 n.8.
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that “there were things about those rooms that were not to code.”253
Messing testified to his own observations of the rooms and that because the ceiling was barely above head height, he was sure it was
not built to code and that this was what he called a “red flag.”254
Nevertheless, Fragale testified that Messing had assured him
that the addition was built to code, that it just happened to not be
permitted.255 On this basis, a reasonable jury could conclude, per the
court’s instructions, that Messing “must have known that the representation was false when made or must have made the representation
recklessly without knowing whether it was true or false.”256 Making
statements without knowing whether they are true or false, i.e., recklessly made statements, suffice, in the Second District, under
Fragale, to justify a bargain-based award, as the functional equivalent of an intentional misrepresentation.257
C.

2006 - Strebel v. Brenlar Investments, Inc.

In Strebel v. Brenlar Investments, Inc.,258 a prospective home
purchaser, Strebel, sued a real estate agency and its agent for fraud
for the agent’s failure to disclose the property had tax liens and
judgments exceeding the agreed upon value of the property rendering
it unsalable.259 Strebel sold his home to generate funds for the purchase of the new home but the escrow on the new home could not
close due to the liens and judgments.260 The broker was acting as a
dual agent at the time of the transaction and so was deemed a fiduciary of the plaintiff buyer.261 The question was what the measure of
damages should be where a fiduciary fraudulently induces the sale of
real property by failing to disclose a material fact unrelated to the
value of the property.262
Plaintiff sued, inter alia, for the lost appreciation of the home
that he sold with the measuring period the time between the date he
253
254
255
256
257
258
259
260
261
262

Id. at 624 n.10.
Fragale, 1 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 624 n.10.
Id.
Id.
Id.
37 Cal. Rptr. 3d 699 (Ct. App. 1st Dist. 2006).
Id. at 701.
Id.
Id.
Id.
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sold his original home and the date of trial.263 Plaintiff’s expert calculated damages by subtracting the 1999 sale price of his home from
his opinion of the trial-date current fair market value of the house.264
The expert relied upon on a study of comparable sales and a market
survey showing the rate of appreciation in the area in which the home
was located, net of closing costs.265
The trial court admitted evidence of appreciation, holding lost
appreciation a proper element of recovery under CCC § 3343, as well
as CCC §§ 1709 and 3333 for “all harm or loss caused” by defendant’s wrongful conduct, whether or not it could be anticipated.266 The
court began by observing the out-of-pocket rule would not be applicable as fiduciary fraud was alleged; instead, the broad tort recovery
rules in CCC §§ 1709 and 3333 would govern.267 The court
acknowledged a split in authority regarding the proper measure of
damages under CCC § 3333, contrasting Fragale and Pepitone with
Overgaard and Hensley, and that CCC § 3333 does not set forth a
bargain-based rule, but merely a tort measure of damages designed to
compensate plaintiff for any loss sustained—not to provide the benefit of his bargain.268
Plaintiff’s damages were the result of non-disclosure of liens
and judgments neither of which directly related to the actual value of
the property and the court observed that the question was not whether
plaintiff was entitled to out-of-pocket losses or the benefit of his bargain, but whether the amount by which the value of home appreciated
after he sold was a reasonable measure of the harm suffered as the
consequence of defendant’s fraud.269 Tort damages, the court continued, are intended to fully compensate the victim for all the injury suffered.270 Observing that CCC § 3333 does not provide any fixed
measure of damages, the court explained that it was required to award
whatever measure “most appropriately compensates” the injured party for the loss sustained.271
Plaintiff argued he was injured because defendant’s fraud
263
264
265
266
267
268
269
270
271

Strebel, 37 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 701.
Id. at 702.
Id.
Id. at 703.
Id.
Strebel, 37 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 705.
Id. at 705-06.
Id. at 706.
Id.
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caused him to sell his home sooner than he would otherwise have
done and that this rendered him unable to buy a replacement home
before housing values substantially increased.272 The resulting decrease in buying power of his proceeds in a rapidly appreciating
housing market prevented him from buying what he could have
bought had there been no fraud and, for that reason, the appeal court
held that the jury was entitled to find recovery of lost appreciation
was reasonable compensation for plaintiff’s then inability to buy an
acceptable home.273
Defendants, relying on Anderson, argued such damages were
not permissible under CCC §§ 3333 and 1709 because damages
caused by a fraud must be determined as of the date when the fraud
took effect, not the date of a later increase or decline in value. 274 The
court, however, noted that, in Anderson, the court held there was a
basis in California law for “appreciation damages” and authority for
giving the trier of fact discretion to choose a date other than the date
of the fraud to “fix damages.”275 The court found that measuring
plaintiff’s damages as of the date of the sale would not provide compensation for the most significant portion of his losses and that applying appreciation-based damages, in the circumstances, was both reasonable and equitable:
[T]here is nothing inequitable about the recovery of
appreciation damages in this case. The fact that . . .
[plaintiff] received what was the fair market value for
his house at the time he sold it did not eliminate financial loss from the premature sale of the property. . . .
The amount by which the value of . . . [plaintiff’s]
former home appreciated after the fraudulently induced sale was a reasonable measure of his damage in
this case.276
Appreciation damages were held permissible under CCC §§ 3333 and
1709.277
272

Id.
Strebel, 37 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 706.
274
Id.
275
Id. at 707.
276
Id. at 709-10.
277
See also Everest Properties II v. Prometheus Dev. Co., No. A114305, 2007 WL
2793374, at *29-30 (Cal. Ct. App. 1st Dist. Sept. 27, 2007) (trial court properly computed
benefit-of-the-bargain damages by calculating the primary component of damages as the dif273
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2007 - Pointe San Diego Residential Community,
L.P. v. W.W.I. Properties, L.L.C.

The dispute in Pointe San Diego Residential Community, L.P.
v. W.W.I. Properties, L.L.C.,278arose from a series of real estate financing transactions involving development of 1000 acres, a mixed
use community that would include a business park, golf course and
resort and over 900 single family homes.279 One fiduciary breach
claim was pleaded as both a direct and derivative suit.280 Error was
alleged because the court refused to apply a benefit of the bargain
theory to the fiduciary breaches of the party which was providing the
financing.281 The Fourth District began its analysis by observing neither CCC §§ 3300 nor 3333 expressly sets forth a benefit-of-thebargain rule but cases note that § 3300 tends to give the injured party
the benefit of his bargain.282
The Fourth District upheld the trial court’s determination of
damages relying on the analysis set forth in Overgaard, specifically
that CCC § 3333 does not set forth any benefit of the bargain rule and
does not provide for recovery any contract bargain but it does permit
courts to compensate plaintiff for all their losses.283 The court explained that although in a given factual situation the result of applying CCC §§ 3300 or 3333 might turn out to be the same, the idea behind § 3333 is simply to make the successful plaintiff whole whereas
the idea behind CCC § 3300 is to enforce a contract. 284 The court relied on Overgaard, noting Overgaard had identified cases in which
ference between the value of certain apartments specified in a proxy statement, and the appraised fair market value at the time of approval of a merger; court considered evidence that
the value of the apartment buildings increased after the merger, as an element of compensatory damages, along with lost prospective profits under CCC § 3333, concluding that damage measure would compensate plaintiff for “all detriment of any kind proximately caused”
and “plaintiff was not limited to recovery of the actual value of the property of which it was
deprived, but was also entitled to any unrealized future profits and increase in assets of the
partnership that resulted from approval of the merger transaction.”). But see Hogan v.
Deangelis Const., Inc., Nos. A117321, A118257, A120840, 2009 WL 1398646 (Cal. Ct.
App. 1st Dist. May 20, 2009) (rejecting claim for lost appreciation of home sold to fund acquisition of new property (as well as compensation for loss of favorable tax basis in sold
home) and rejecting claim for appreciation as inconsistent with rescission remedy).
278
No. D044695, 2007 WL 1991205 (Cal. Ct. App. 4th Dist. July 11, 2007).
279
The transactions are described in detail in the decision. Id. at *3-7.
280
Id. at *2.
281
Id. at *3.
282
Id. at *7 (quoting Overgaard, 137 Cal. Rptr. at 416).
283
Pointe San Diego, 2007 WL 1991205, at *7.
284
Id.
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application of CCC § 3333 did not did not result in a benefit-of-thebargain award.285
Holding that CCC § 3333 allows judges the discretion to fashion awards that compensate plaintiff for the detriment defendant’s
tortious conduct causes, the court explained that the real issue regarding the damage award was not whether, as a matter of law, plaintiff
was entitled to recover bargain-based rather than out-of-pocket damages, but whether the breach of fiduciary duty damages the court
awarded constituted a reasonable measure of the harm suffered as a
consequence of tortious conduct.286 Tort damages, the court explained, are awarded to fully compensate the victim for all the injury
suffered.287 There is no fixed rule for the measure of tort damages
under § 3333 and courts should adopt the measure that most appropriately compensates the injured party for the loss sustained.288 The
court attributed analytical difficulties regarding the appropriate
measure of damages to the plethora of “confusing rules” resulting
from different types of cases, some based on contract, others on
fraud, and still others on unjust enrichment, and criticized litigants
and courts which considered the out-of-pocket and benefit-of-thebargain rules as the sole “antagonists on the battlefield of damages”
when, in fact, at times neither is actually applicable.289
It explained that plaintiff’s argument rested on the erroneous
premise that CCC § 3333 provides a benefit-of-the-bargain measure
of damages in all cases involving breach of a fiduciary duty, and,
therefore, that the court was required to apply that measure, as a matter of law, excluding all other possible measures of damages. 290 Rather, the court held that courts have the flexibility and discretion to
award damages in whatever measure or amount most appropriately
compensates the victim for all the detriment proximately caused by
the specific breaches of fiduciary duty proved at trial.291
The court held that, as of the trial date, the development was
on-going and that no net profits had been shown that would trigger

285
286
287
288
289
290
291

Id.
Id.
Id.
Pointe San Diego, 2007 WL 1991205, at *7.
Id.
Id.
Id.
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the distribution provisions of the WWI Operating Agreement.292 Although the trial court found a number of breaches of fiduciary duty, it
also found that the sale at issue did not result in any damage so that
the parties were effectively in the positions they previously occupied,
aside from improper commission payments and improperly charged
legal and accounting expenses.293 The appeal court found no error in
the lower court’s approach to assessing the damages for breach of fiduciary duty.294
VII.

“CONTRACT BARGAINS,” “ALL THE DETRIMENT,” AND
“ANY DAMAGE”
A.

California’s Jury Instructions on Fraud and Deceit
Damages

California’s jury instructions provide guidance on fraud and
deceit damages. BAJI 12.57 on Fraud and Deceit Damages, for example, states, in relevant part that: “The amount of such award shall
be the difference between the actual value of that which the plaintiff
received and the value which it would have had if the fraudulent representation had been true. This is sometimes referred to as the ‘benefit of the bargain.”295
The Use Note to BAJI 12.57 provides, in relevant part: “This
instruction applies . . . to fraud in the purchase, sale or exchange of
property, real or personal, where the defrauding party stands in a fiduciary relationship to the defrauded party.”296 As pointed out in
Hensley, neither Walsh nor Simone support the proposition benefit of
the bargain damages are available in California and other courts, noting the Use Notes do not support the proposition that benefit of the
292

Id. at *8.
Pointe San Diego, 2007 WL 1991205, at *8.
294
See generally Kolodge v. Boyd, Nos. A101485, A102094, 2004 WL 2669272 (Cal. Ct.
App. 1st Dist. Nov. 23, 2004) (law unclear as to whether benefit of the bargain must be
awarded under CCC § 1709 where there a fiduciary duty is present—tort damages available
for beach of fiduciary duty increase along a scale depending on the seriousness of the fiduciary's breach and that the amount of damages that may be awarded should turn on whether the
breach was intentional or merely negligent and, if intentional, greater damages might be
awarded if the intention was specific rather than general and, if the breach was negligent,
greater damages might be awarded if the negligence was gross, rather than simple).
295
CACI No. 12.57 (2015).
296
Id. See Walsh, 28 Cal. Rptr. at 18; Simone, 298 P.2d at 669.
293
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bargain damages are available, have rejected the instruction.297 For
example, in CRSS Commercial Group, Inc. v. Toothman,298 the court
criticized the instruction:
CRSS cites BAJI No. 12.57 as supporting the proposition that it is entitled to benefit of the bargain damages
on its fraud claim. BAJI No. 12.57 is neither a statute
nor a court opinion and has no precedential value in
and of itself. Moreover, although BAJI 12.57 does indeed instruct that benefit of the bargain damages may
be awarded to a plaintiff in a fraud action, the authorities cited in the Use Notes to the instruction do not
stand for that proposition. In Gagne v. Bertran, the
court held only that “damages whether for deceit, or
negligence, must be measured by the actual losses suffered because of the misrepresentation.” The court in
Roberts v. Karr merely cited the holding in Gagne as
authority for the same conclusion. Indeed, the Roberts
court . . . specifically recognized that Gagne does not
support an award of benefit of the bargain damages in
a fraud action.299
The CRSS Court conceded the existence of authority awarding benefit of the bargain damages for fraud committed by a fiduciary.300
Cases commenting on the BAJI 12.57 reflect the lack of clarity in the
law and none clearly or comprehensively explain why the loss of a
contract bargain does (or does not) fall within the “all the detriment”
language of § 3333, or the “any damage which he thereby suffers”
language of CCC§ 1709.
B.

“All the Detriment Proximately Caused” and “Any
Damage Which He Thereby Suffers”

California Civil Code § 3282 defines “detriment” as “a loss or

297

Hensley, 109 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 492.
61 Cal. Rptr. 2d 673 (Ct. App. 1st Dist. 1997).
299
Id. at 677-78 (quoting Gagne, 275 P.2d at 22, and Roberts v. Carr, 3 Cal. Rptr. 98, 103
(Ct. App. 4th Dist. 1960)).
300
Id. at 678 (namely Alliance, 900 P.2d at 609-10; Stout, 586 P.2d at 1232; and Salahutdin 29 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 469; but noted contrary authority in Overgaard, 137 Cal. Rptr. at
416-17).
298
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harm suffered in person or property.”301 As set forth in Potter v.
Firestone Tire & Rubber Co.,302 California courts have looked to the
definition the term “harm” set forth in the Restatement Second of
Torts.303 It states, “ ‘Harm,’ under the Restatement Second of Torts
means ‘the existence of loss or detriment in fact of any kind to a person . . . . According to the Restatement’s analysis, a plaintiff is entitled to recover damages from the tortfeasor for all ‘harm’—as opposed to ‘physical harm’—‘past, present and prospective, legally
caused by the tort.’ ”304 There is obvious circularity. The statute defines “detriment” in terms of “loss or harm.”305
The Restatement defines “harm” in terms of “loss” or “detriment” of “any kind.”306 The “kind of harm,” in the cases discussed,
is “financial harm,” loss of monies due a party injured by defendant’s
failure to comply with fiduciary obligations. Loss of a real property
contract bargain seems to naturally fall within the language “all the
detriment” because some thing with a discernable value is being
lost—and loss is “a harm” under California law, the Restatement and
CCC § 3282. There has been substantial resistance to recognizing the
loss of a contract bargain as a recoverable detriment in real property
transactions governed by under CCC §§ 3333 and 1709 primarily because both statutes articulate tort remedies which, historically, have
been counter-posed to contract remedies. Tort remedies normally do
not include bargain-based expectancy damages.
Because tort and contract effectively operate in different legal
worlds, the effort to read contract damages into the remedies provided under even broadly worded tort statutes has been viewed by some
courts with hostility, e.g., Hensley and Overgaard. However, where
tortious conduct accompanies a contract breach and results in proximately caused financial harm, the economic detriment (loss) to the
non-breaching party is equivalent to the financial value of the lost
bargain. It is not necessary to conclude CCC §§ 3333 and 1709 provide benefit-of-the-bargain damages if the remedy for fiduciary
breach caused harm may be properly measured by the value of the
expectancy lost. This is why several cases have stated CCC §§ 3333
301
302
303
304
305
306

CAL. CIV. CODE § 3282 (West 2014).
863 P.2d 795 (Cal. 1993).
Id. at 835-36.
Id. at 822.
CIV. § 3282.
Potter, 863 P.2d at 822.
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and 1709 damages most properly compensate plaintiff for all his detriment and, depending on circumstances, may be properly measured
by an out-of-pocket, benefit-of-the-bargain or other measure of “most
appropriate” damages to make plaintiff whole by compensating for
“all detriment” suffered.307
VIII. CONCLUSION
Whether one views the loss of a contractual financial benefit
as a CCC § 3333 “detriment” or merely as a means of quantifying
the “detriment suffered,” recovery measured by the loss of one’s bargain is available under CCC §3333 whether or not these statutes are
construed to “permit,” “mandate” or “approximate” benefit of the
bargain damages. Under CCC § 1709, the loss of a contract bargain
is financial damage to the injured party and falls within the “all damages” statutory language. The quantum of damages under these statutes may, in a particular case, be measured by the economic loss of
the bargain to the injured party. There is little difference between a
statute which provides for a remedy equal to a benefit of the bargain
award and one which expressly provides a benefit of the bargain
remedy.

307

See Martin v. Harpaz, No B204388, 2009 WL 2596178 (Cal. Ct. App. 2d Dist. Aug.
25, 2009) (proper measure of damages is the measure which most appropriately compensates
the injured party for all the loss sustained; plaintiffs were properly permitted to recover damages for the loss of equity in their home because trial court found plaintiffs could have kept
their house and completed construction but for defendants’ fraud—damages measured by the
loss of equity in the house at issue appropriate). See also Amber Hotel Co. v. Chen, No.
B200271, 2009 WL 73624 (Cal. Ct. App. 2d Dist. Jan. 10, 2009) (where plaintiff alleged
fiduciary fraud of dual agent broker in sale of a hotel, the extra measure of blameworthiness
inhering in fraud and fact that courts are not concerned about the need for predictability
about the cost of contractual relationships, in fraud cases, allowed plaintiffs to recover outof-pocket and benefit-of-the-bargain damages).
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